TIF 2.0: upgrading state and local tax increment financing policy in North Carolina by Levengood, Michael
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TIF 2.0:  
Upgrading State and Local Tax Increment Financing  
Policy in North Carolina 
 
 
 
 
 
By: Michael Levengood 
 
April 4, 2011 
 
 
 
Advisor: Nichola Lowe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Master’s Project submitted to the faculty 
of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Regional Planning 
in the Department of City and Regional Planning 
 
 
 
 2 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….3 
Introduction 
Methodology 
A TIF Primer: History and Criticisms 
 
 
Chapter 2: Legislating TIF for North Carolina……………………………………………8 
The Campaign for TIF 
The Project Development Financing Act of 2003 
Project Approval and the LGC 
 
 
Chapter 3: Financing Parton’s Folly: the Case of Roanoke Rapids…………….12 
High Expectations, Limited Success 
Misguided Local Policy 
Legacy of a Failed TIF 
 
 
Chapter 4: Using Local Policy to Guide TIF: the Case of Woodin………............17 
A More Accountable Planning Process 
Winning Approval from a Strengthened LGC 
A Work in Progress 
 
 
Chapter 5: Lessons and Policy Implications……………………………………………...21 
 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………….25 
 
 
References………………………………………………………………………………………………..26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
 
Introduction 
 
Tax increment financing (TIF) is a local economic development tool that has 
grown in popularity over the past several decades. Originally intended to spur 
development in blighted neighborhoods, TIF has become a versatile financing 
instrument approved in every state but Arizona. Despite this popularity, the tool has 
been criticized as a public subsidy for developers and an undemocratic method of 
bypassing voter approval to take financial risks. Supporters, meanwhile, have 
argued that TIF promotes private investment, creates jobs, and increases property 
values and tax revenues. 
 
Researchers have attempted to corroborate these claims through three 
general approaches. One group of investigators, including Anderson (1990), Man 
and Rosentraub (1998), Dardia (1998), Dye and Merrimen (2000), and Byrne (2006, 
2010), has conducted a number of quantitative studies aimed at measuring the 
impacts of TIF on property values and identifying determinants of property value 
and employment growth. Another group, including Weber, et al (2003) has 
investigated both quantitative and qualitative impacts of TIF districts on 
overlapping jurisdictions, such as school districts. And a third group of mainly 
consultants, community activists, and public administration scholars, has 
contributed to the literature a collection of case studies that describe TIF 
developments around the country, identifying successes and failures 
simultaneously. 
 
The knowledge gained from this research, along with a growing backlash 
against government incentives, has led to gradual reforms in TIF policy. A principal 
reform has been the strengthening of state enabling statutes; however, even with 
this protection, municipalities continue to pursue financially risky and ultimately 
unsuccessful TIF developments. One place that demonstrates this problem is North 
Carolina. With voters having approved TIF enabling legislation as recently as 2004, 
the state was one of the last in the country to make TIF a legal financing mechanism. 
Accordingly, North Carolina’s TIF legislation is one of the nation’s strictest, intended 
to prevent the burdensome and inequitable outcomes that have plagued TIF in other 
states.  
 
Despite these regulations, North Carolina’s first experience with TIF was an 
overwhelmingly negative one. Carolina Crossroads, a TIF-financed regional 
entertainment complex located in Roanoke Rapids, was fraught with unrealistic 
expectations, mismanagement, and even alleged fraud. Consequently, the project 
neither produced a profit nor increased property values, forcing the city to cut 
government programs and contemplate tax increases to repay TIF bonds.  
 
This highly publicized failure has limited TIF expansion in the state. Not only 
did the Roanoke Rapids experience signal to other policymakers that poorly 
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conceived TIFs could saddle local governments with enduring financial burden; it 
also led to a negative perception of TIF among voters. Already put off by the costly 
steps required for approval and implementation, many local governments simply 
chose to eschew TIF in favor of more familiar financing mechanisms.  
 
Despite these consequences, however, the Roanoke Rapids’ failure also 
produced a few positive impacts. It inspired, for example, modest reforms to the 
state’s TIF approval process and provided a foil on which to build future policy. To 
date, however, only one North Carolina municipality has elected to give TIF another 
shot. In 2008 the Town of Woodfin, in partnership with Buncombe County, took out 
bonds to redevelop a TIF district centered on the town’s “downtown corridor.” 
Unlike Roanoke Rapids, however, Woodfin’s experience with TIF has been a positive 
one. Not only has the project succeeded in attracting new investment, it has also set 
a precedent on how to create a fiscally responsible and economically beneficial TIF 
district.  
 
Methodology 
 
The following comparative case study of Roanoke Rapids and Woodfin seeks 
to answer two principal research questions. The first question, what factors 
contributed to the cases’ divergent outcomes, attempts to understand why Roanoke 
Rapids and Woodfin experienced such different TIF results despite creating their 
districts under the same formal state regulations. Stemming from this query is a 
secondary question that hopes to establish broader implications: How can state and 
local TIF policies be improved to lower risks to local governments and increase 
benefits to communities, while not compromising TIF’s attractiveness as a 
development tool?  
 
To answer these questions, the paper utilizes scholarly research, local news 
articles, policy documents, and semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in the 
two cases. Among the interviewed parties are former and current members of North 
Carolina’s Local Government Commission (LGC), a key TIF regulatory institution in 
the state. Other interviewees include the city and county managers of Woodfin and 
Buncombe County and a representative from a local think-tank that advocates TIF 
reform. Though interview results from Roanoke Rapids are limited, the case’s high 
profile has contributed to a wealth of secondary sources, which have been consulted 
for this study. News articles have chronicled, for example, the development, demise, 
and ongoing aftermath of the Roanoke Rapids TIF, while providing insight into the 
opinions of local and state policymakers. Furthermore, a lawsuit filed by a resident 
of Roanoke Rapids offers an account of both alleged misconduct and factual events 
surrounding the case.   
 
In addition to interviews and secondary sources, this study relies heavily on 
public documents from Woodfin, Roanoke Rapids, and the state. These documents 
include North Carolina’s TIF enabling amendment and legislation; local 
development agreements; consultant analyses; local government resolutions; 
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financial agreements; drafted TIF policies; meeting minutes; and bond receipts. 
Finally, this study consults scholarly research and case studies from around the 
country in order to highlight the history and criticisms of TIF and provide a broader 
theoretical and political backdrop on which to analyze the North Carolina cases. 
 
Together, the aforementioned sources support this paper’s principle 
argument: that sound local policies and state and local knowledge sharing are 
essential elements of TIF plans that minimize risk and benefit communities. This 
conclusion is vital to synthesizing existing research, which has identified the merits 
and perils of TIF both generally and for specific cases, but offered limited insight 
into how localities can remedy criticisms and learn from earlier mistakes. The 
lessons of Roanoke Rapids and Woodfin can therefore assist local and state-level 
policymakers from around the country as they strive to upgrade TIF into a 
financially viable tool for an economically uncertain 21st Century. 
 
This paper follows by first providing a brief primer on TIF and identifying 
common criticisms of the financing tool. In Chapter 2, North Carolina’s system of TIF 
regulation is introduced. The Roanoke Rapids case is then presented in Chapter 3, 
with close attention paid to the policy and planning decisions that contributed to the 
project’s ultimate failure. Chapter 4 analyzes the Woodfin TIF and highlights 
differences in policies between the two cases. Chapter 5 then draws lessons from 
the cases in order to make recommendations for local governments and state 
institutions. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes by mentioning the implications these 
lessons may have for developments in TIF policy across the country.    
 
A TIF Primer: History and Criticisms 
 
Though relatively new and sparingly used in North Carolina, tax increment 
financing has been available to local governments in some states for nearly 60 years.  
First developed in California in 1952, TIF began to gain widespread popularity in 
the late 1970s (Man & Rosentraub, 1998). This sudden surge in adoption was in 
response to a number of factors: a steep decline in federal funding for economic 
development, new state-imposed debt restrictions and “tax revolts” like California’s 
Proposition 13, which capped property tax growth, and low interest rates 
(Goddeeris & Weber, 2007). Not requiring upfront tax dollars, voter approval, or 
federal aid, TIF was a financing innovation.  
 
TIF functions by allowing counties or municipalities to identify a 
geographically delineated district and assess its property value, establishing a “base 
rate” of taxation. The locality then takes out bonds to finance public improvements 
or repay developers for their initial expenditures. For a set period of time, the 
appreciation in the district’s property value will be “captured” and maintained 
locally to pay off the bonds and fund continual improvements (Blocher & Morgan, 
2008). Though captured revenue can be used in a pay-as-you-go format, in which 
the local government and developers gradually improve the site as revenue 
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becomes available, more often local governments take out bonds to cover the costs 
of site improvements before development occurs. 
 
Early in TIF’s history, increment revenues were used almost exclusively to 
improve infrastructure in blighted areas where developers would otherwise be 
unlikely to invest. However, lenient state regulation has allowed TIF to operate as an 
increasingly speculative tool (Marks, 2005). Indeed, in recent decades TIF bonds 
have become particularly attractive for financing infrastructure on rural and 
suburban green field sites where growth may or may not be imminent (Maryl, 
2006). TIF districts have been used, for example, to lure a Cabela’s big box retail 
store to suburban Forth Worth (“TIF 10: Lone Star”, 2009); develop the “world’s 
longest strip shopping center” on a floodplain outside of St. Louis (Vespereny, 
2008); and finance an expansive new urbanist development in the desert outside 
Albuquerque (LeRoy, 2008). Not surprisingly, these types of developments have 
drawn growing criticism from scholars, policymakers, and the public. 
 
One major critique is that TIFs do not create net economic gain but simply 
attract or re-orient growth away from other parts of a city (Dye & Merriman, 2000). 
This becomes particularly problematic if the growth is being channeled away from 
lower income neighborhoods to wealthy, growing parts of cities. Another critique 
targets the question of “but for”—whether or not a development would occur in the 
absence of TIF (Sands, Reese & Trudeau, 2009). Projects located in rapidly growing 
areas, where growth is likely to occur without incentives, are especially vulnerable 
to this criticism. Other concerns involve overlapping jurisdictions. TIF may strain, 
for example, school districts, as property taxes that may have otherwise gone 
toward schools are now “captured” in TIF districts. TIF may strain these public 
services even further if it draws new residents to a district (Weber, 2003). 
 
One way of addressing these criticisms has been for states to strengthen their 
TIF enabling legislations. For example, many states set in their legislations a limit on 
the percentage of a jurisdiction that can be covered by TIF districts. Some states also 
only approve TIF for certain kinds of land uses, including blight redevelopment, 
conservation zones, and industrial districts (Sands, Reese & Trudeau, 2009). Other 
state-level reforms include requiring local governments to demonstrate “but for”; 
creating state-level commissions to approve TIF plans; and mandating prevailing 
wage rates for TIF-funded developments.  
 
Local governments have also pursued reforms. Some municipalities allow 
optional participation by overlapping jurisdictions, allowing school districts, for 
example, to choose what percentage of tax increment revenues they would like to 
contribute to a TIF district. Other local policies have allowed school districts and 
other overlapping jurisdictions to share in the revenues captured by TIF (Goddeeris 
& Weber, 2007). Finally, a number of jurisdictions have pursued reforms connecting 
TIF to quality job creation. These policies include requiring that TIF-funded 
businesses pay a living wage; mandating that a certain number of jobs be created in 
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order to receive TIF funds; and instituting TIF-funded workforce development 
programs like Chicago’s TIFWorks.  
 
On the whole, these reforms have curbed TIF abuse and strengthened the 
connection between the financing tool and economic development. Yet, they have 
taken on altered relevance in today’s economic climate. Given the current paucity of 
real estate development, the “but for” requirement has become largely obsolete, as it 
is much easier to imply that development would not occur without incentive. On the 
other hand, the need for protecting overlapping jurisdictions is even more acute 
than in the past as local school districts, for example, experience deep budget cuts. 
Finally, job creation is more critical than ever in today’s economic development 
environment. 
 
The economic downturn has also exposed one of TIF’s principle flaws, one 
that has been relatively untouched by the academic literature: often, TIF districts 
simply fail to produce the revenues necessary to repay bonds. While this fact was 
easy to overlook during the real estate boom, it is pertinent now as local 
governments and developers are more dependent on innovative financing tools yet 
(along with lenders) are more risk averse than ever. Furthermore, a failed TIF 
district may place a heavy and enduring financial burden on a city, which is all the 
more onerous in today’s economy.  
 
For TIF to continue to be a financially viable and successful economic 
development tool, the process of reform must continue, though not unilaterally. 
State-level institutions, though capable of advising local governments and 
prohibiting certain kinds of development, cannot alone prevent TIF failings. Local 
actors must also play a role in reform. As Jensen (2008) found in the North Carolina 
context, local governments can curb TIF misuse by following a set of locality-specific 
guidelines that consider policy objectives, risk tolerance, and public support. 
Though this advice offers a jumping off point for creating sound local policy, it skirts 
the state’s potential role and is somewhat generalized, having been based on 
literature and interviews with policymakers from across the state. The following 
case studies offer a reworked and expanded set of local and state recommendations 
grounded in the concrete experiences of two North Carolina municipalities. 
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Chapter 2: Legislating TIF for North Carolina 
 
The Campaign for TIF 
 
Tax increment financing gained widespread popularity in the 1980s 
following steep declines in federal funding for economic development. While many 
states approved TIF during this time period, North Carolina local governments were 
unable to utilize this “quintessential post-federal entrepreneurial policy” (Weber, 
2003). The state required the passage of a constitutional amendment in order to 
enable TIF, and state legislators indeed placed TIF on the ballot on two separate 
occasions. However, in both 1983 and 1992 voters rejected the financing 
mechanism (Blocher & Morgan, 2008).  
 
One explanation for these failures has been the wording of “tax increment 
financing.” Some observers claim voters saw the word “tax” and perceived a tax 
increase (Elkins, 2004). Wary of tax anathema, therefore, in 2004, state lawmakers 
proposed a new name for the tool: “self-financing bonds,” which later became 
“project development financing.” Though identical to previous amendments in all 
but name, this latest push for TIF occurred against a new policy backdrop.  
 
Rather than simply targeting downtown revitalization and blight reduction, 
as was once typical, the new campaign to pass the TIF-enabling “Amendment One” 
promoted grander policy objectives. Throughout 2004, a powerful coalition called 
North Carolinians for Jobs and Progress conducted an “aggressive statewide 
campaign to educate voters on the merits of self-financing bonds” (“Agenda and 
Minutes”, 2004). Including former governors Jim Holshouser, Jim Hunt, and Jim 
Martin as well as representatives of the NC Association of County Commissioners, 
the NC League of Municipalities; and the NC Economic Developers Association, the 
coalition argued that TIF would make the state more competitive in the global 
economy, create new jobs, and attract industry to depressed areas (“Approval of 
North Carolina Self-Financing Bonds Bodes Well for Economic Development,” 2004). 
Furthermore, supporters argued that TIF would help to offset precipitous job losses 
in the state’s declining traditional industries of tobacco, furniture, and textiles (Juby, 
2005).  
 
Despite fierce criticism from the Raleigh-based John Locke Foundation, a 
libertarian think tank, and a handful of local policymakers, the campaign to approve 
TIF succeeded in November 2004, if just barely. North Carolinians voted in favor of 
Article 5, Section 14, i.e. “Amendment One,” by a margin of 51 to 49 percent 
(Chesser, 2006). The framing of TIF as a job creation tool that would allow North 
Carolina to compete with the other 48 TIF-allowing states was ultimately credited 
with securing voter approval (Blocher & Morgan, 2008).  
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The Project Development Financing Act of 2003 
 
Though the passage of Amendment One made TIF available to local 
governments in November 2004, the North Carolina General Assembly had already 
passed enabling legislation in the summer of 2003 (Purvis, 2008). That legislation, 
known as the Project Development Financing Act, continues to govern TIF use in the 
state and includes detailed guidelines on TIF use and approval.   
 
As argued by Amendment One supporters, the North Carolina legislation 
includes “some of the strongest accountability safeguards in the country” (“Council 
Minutes,” 2004). Due to the state’s late arrival to TIF, legislators were able to craft a 
law that incorporated lessons from around the country. For example, in addition to 
municipalities, North Carolina makes TIF available to counties, an expansion that 
was an evolution in some states (Lucas & Jeffcoat, 2004). Furthermore, North 
Carolina limited TIF to funding only certain kinds of developments from the outset. 
In other states, these kinds of restrictions required lawmakers to make substantial 
revisions to enabling statutes. 
 
In North Carolina, to be eligible for TIF, land must fall into one of two 
categories, each with its own set of property limitations. If targeting a 
redevelopment area, a TIF can include “property that is blighted because of 
dilapidated, deteriorated, aged, or obsolete buildings; inadequate ventilation, light, 
air, sanitation, or open spaces; high population density or overcrowding; or 
unsanitary or unsafe conditions” (N.C. G.S. 160A-515.1, 2003). 
 
  Though this first category represents TIF’s original purpose, a second type of 
development expands its usage. Also eligible are areas that are “blighted, 
deteriorated, undeveloped, or inappropriately developed from the standpoint of 
sound community development and growth; appropriate for rehabilitation or 
conservation activities; or appropriate for the economic development of the 
community” (N.C.G.S. 153A-7.3, 2003). This second category permits a degree of 
interpretation and therefore shifts the burden of defining financeable development 
to local governments. 
 
  To shield the state from oft-criticized TIF-financed sprawl, North Carolina 
requires that if located outside a central city, no more than 20% of a TIF district’s 
square footage can be used for retail sale, hotels, banking, financial services, or other 
non-office commercial uses. Notably, however, an exception is made tourism-related 
developments in the state’s least developed (Tier One) counties. Furthermore, TIF 
districts can constitute no more than 5% of a city or county’s land area (N.C.G.S. 
158-7.3, 2003). Some states such as Illinois lack this kind of restriction; 
consequently TIF districts encompass over 30% of the city of Chicago (Verwymeren, 
2008). 
 
  As in other states, another key element of North Carolina’s legislation is an 
explanation of the types of improvements that can be financed by TIF. These include 
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utilities; water projects; streets and sidewalks; transportation and parking; low and 
moderate income housing; health care facilities; civic, cultural, and entertainment 
projects; industrial developments; historic preservation; and transit-oriented 
development (Lucas & Jeffcoat, 2004). The legislation also sets wage requirements 
for TIF-financed manufacturing developments; allows cities and counties to jointly 
establish TIF districts; and prevents cities from levying new taxes as a means of 
repaying bonds. Finally, to counter the criticism that TIF may place strain on 
overlapping jurisdictions such as school districts, North Carolina requires that local 
governments obtain consent from all overlapping taxing entities (Lucas & Jeffcoat, 
2004). 
 
Project Approval and the LGC 
 
  While the aforementioned requirements are generally similar to the reforms 
being pursued by other states, North Carolina includes an additional unique method 
of TIF oversight. The state’s Local Government Commission (LGC) must approve 
local plans before TIF bonds can be issued. This requirement not only exposes local 
governments to a set of approval criteria, but it also enables the state to counsel and 
educate local policymakers.   
 
  A product of the Great Depression, in which North Carolina was home to the 
second highest number of municipal bond defaults in the country, the LGC is 
charged with approving not just TIF but all issuances of local government debt in 
the state (Coe, 2007). Furthermore, the LGC oversees financial operations of cities, 
counties, school systems, hospitals, airports, and water and sewer district. 
Accordingly, the institution involves a range of actors with diverse roles. The 
Commission itself, for example, consists of nine members: the State Treasurer, State 
Auditor, Secretary of State, Secretary of Revenue, and five appointees. Assisting the 
Commission is a staff consisting of 34 professional and administrative employees (T. 
Romocki, personal communication, 24 March 2011).  
 
  While Commission members are charged with making final approval 
decisions on debt issuances, it is the staff that interacts most directly with local 
governments. In the case of TIF, LGC staff work with local policymakers to 
determine the feasibility of projects and identify the most expedient form of 
financing (“State and Local Government Finance Decision,” 2007). Staff members 
also help local governments develop plans that are compliant with state legislation 
and process TIF applications, summarize third-party analysis, and make approval 
recommendations to Commission members (T. Romocki, personal communication, 
24 March 2011). 
 
  As outlined in the Project Development Financing Act, TIF plans must meet a 
number of criteria in order to gain ultimate approval from the LGC. Local 
governments must show, for example, that they have delineated the boundaries of 
the TIF district. They must also provide a description of the proposed development; 
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identify costs and funding sources for public improvements; and determine the base 
valuation of the district along with projected property value increases. The LGC 
must also receive evidence that the project will benefit residents and business 
owners in the district; and that development would not take place “but for” TIF 
financing (“Tax Increment Financing (TIF) in North Carolina: Frequently Asked 
Questions”). In addition to determining whether a TIF project meets these criteria, 
the LGC also evaluates the county or municipality’s capacity for repaying bonds. 
Most important is a finding that the locality has pledged sufficient revenues for debt 
service; however, the Commission also evaluates the local government’s debt 
management policies and considers whether debt can be marketed at reasonable 
cost (“Amendment One: Project Development Financing,” 2005). 
 
After a TIF plan emerges from the gauntlet of LGC regulation, the state or 
county may issue bonds, at which point the local government may collect revenues 
and begin paying for district improvements. However, even the most scrutinized 
plans are not guaranteed to achieve financial viability and economic success. Indeed 
North Carolina’s first TIF development illustrates that even with strict state 
regulation, a project can fail to substantially increase property values and thus exert 
a heavy burden on local government. 
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Chapter 3: Financing Parton’s Folly: the Case of Roanoke Rapids 
 
High Expectations, Limited Success 
 
The plans for North Carolina’s first TIF project were initiated around the 
same time that TIF was approved in the state. In 2004, Richard Watson, a former 
president and CEO of the Northeastern North Carolina Economic Development 
Commission, first proposed an entertainment theater for eastern North Carolina. 
Though the exact nature of their partnership is disputed, court documents indicate 
that Watson had been working with Randy Parton, a country music entertainer and 
brother to Dolly, and that the two were searching for a city willing to host the 
theater (Garrett v. Parton, Halifax County Superior Court, 2009). 
 
Roanoke Rapids, a city of around 16,000 people (U.S. Census) near the 
Virginia border, expressed interest. According to a lawsuit later filed by local 
citizens, after corresponding with Watson, the city and the Halifax County Tourism 
Development Authority presented a letter of intent to Parton outlining a plan for the 
theater. Parton’s newly formed company Moonlight Bandit, LLC allegedly then 
suggested to the city that they consider using TIF bonds to finance the project 
(Garrett v. Parton, Halifax County Superior Court, 2009). 
 
Before the city proceeded further, the North Carolina Rural Economic 
Development Center commissioned Economic Research Associates (ERA), an 
international consulting firm, to conduct a feasibility study on the theater. The 
consultants concluded that a 1,500-seat theater would be viable but only if key 
components of the proposed “Carolina Crossroads Music and Entertainment 
District” were up and running by the time the theater opened. With the theater as its 
anchor, Carolina Crossroads was to include retail, hotels, and other entertainment 
venues. Specifically, ERA indicated that at least 200,000 square feet of retail and two 
hotels were necessary to buoy the theater (“Final Report: Randy Parton Theater 
Feasibility Study,” 2005).  
 
The Carolina Center for Competitive Economies (C3) at UNC-Chapel Hill also 
conducted an economic impact analysis for the city. Their report used IMPLAN 
software to predict that Carolina Crossroads would produce significant direct 
economic impacts but potentially limited indirect and induced employment impacts 
in the region. The explanation for this disparity, and indeed a major caveat, was that 
temporary construction jobs would be major contributors to venue’s direct impact. 
Therefore, aside from construction jobs, the project’s economic impacts were 
predicted to be relatively small (Lugar & Israeli, 2005).   
 
Despite the questions raised by these reports, in June 2005 Roanoke Rapids 
entered into an Economic Development Agreement (EDA) with Parton and others 
regarding the project (“Economic Development Agreement,” 2005). The EDA 
described a complex arrangement in which the city would provide 15 acres of green 
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field to be developed into the theater by B&C Roanoke, LLC. Once constructed, the 
theater would then be purchased by the city with revenues from TIF bonds at which 
point the city would also begin making public infrastructure improvements. 
Parton’s company Moonlight Bandits LLC would then rent the theater from the city 
and operate the venue. The EDA also included a highly controversial provision that 
the city would pay Parton a $1.5 million annual “artist fee” for his services in 
bringing acts to the theater and himself performing. This fee was to be paid out of 
the theater’s revenue as a first priority cost (“Economic Development Agreement,” 
2005). 
 
Along with the EDA, the city prepared a request for $21.5 in TIF bonds. The 
application, which was presented to the LGC, described among other details how the 
city intended to pay back its bonds. Having first pledged lease payments from 
Parton and Moonlight Bandit, LLC, the city also pledged its property tax increment 
revenues (the traditional TIF revenue source), and even its own sales tax collections 
if necessary. Furthermore, the city had obtained a letter of credit from Bank of 
America. Having satisfied all of the requirements and most importantly 
demonstrating that the bonds could be repaid (through four separate channels), the 
LGC granted approval to the city’s application and issued interim financing in the 
amount of $4 million in bonds in March 2006. In February 2007 the remainder of 
the $21.5 million in bonds was issued to the city (“Roanoke Rapids TIF: Summary)”.  
 
After receiving the bonds, the city purchased the theater, which had been 
completed in March 2007 at a cost of $13 million, and put the remaining money 
toward insurance expenses, debt service for the first year, and a debt service 
reserve fund. After Parton took possession of the theater and performed his first 
show, however, his relationship with the city quickly deteriorated. The city had 
come to realize that theater attendance estimates had been unrealistic and that 
Parton was not the experienced performer and manager that he was originally 
portrayed to be. Furthermore, city officials argued that Parton had exhausted a $3 
million reserve fund made of taxpayer money (Minnick, 2007).  
 
Consequently, the city negotiated new contracts with Parton in September 
and November of 2007, lowering his artist’s fee and diminishing his role in the 
operations of the theater. Finally, in December, Parton missed a scheduled show due 
to reported drunkenness, leading the city to terminate his association with the 
theater (Minnick, 2007). The city then took full control of the theater’s operations, 
renaming it “The Roanoke Rapids Theater,” and entered into a Settlement 
Agreement in which it paid $750,000 to Parton and Moonlight Bandit, whom were 
then released from all terms of the EDA (“Performance and Management 
Agreement, 2007). 
 
Misguided Local Policy 
 
Since Parton’s dismissal at the end of 2007, a number of stakeholders and 
observers have criticized the planning process surrounding Carolina Crossroads. 
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One Roanoke Rapids resident filed suit against Parton and the Northeastern North 
Carolina Regional Economic Development Commission on behalf of city taxpayers 
(the claim was dismissed). Separately, Northeast Commission CEO Rick Watson was 
subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury (Browder, 2008). And the 
Carolina Journal, a publication of the conservative John Locke Foundation, published 
a series of expose articles on theater.    
 
This scrutiny revealed a series of misguided actions on the part of 
stakeholders and poor local policy on the part of Roanoke Rapids. A principal error 
made by the city was pursuing a project that was rife with conflicts of interest. 
Documents obtained by the Carolina Journal and referenced in lawsuits expose 
numerous conflicts and show that Rick Watson had held an ownership interest in 
Moonlight Bandit Productions while still CEO at the Northeastern North Carolina 
Economic Development Commission. In other conflicts uncovered by the Carolina 
Journal, a developer who served on the Northeast Commission had at the same time 
signed a binding letter of intent to partner with Parton, and the Northeast 
Commission’s attorney also counted Parton as one of his clients (Carrington, 2008). 
 
While these conflicts of interest did not directly involve the city, they indicate 
that Roanoke Rapids either failed to perform due diligence investigating its business 
partners or was cognizant of the conflicts yet failed to remedy them. Either of these 
explanations is troubling, as conflicts of interest can be destabilizing and expose 
projects to situations in which personal financial gain may be put above local and 
regional economic development goals. Furthermore, conflicts may weaken the trust 
local residents hold in their public institutions (“Recommendation of the Council on 
Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service,” 2003). 
 
Another shortcoming of Roanoke Rapids’ involvement in the development 
was the city’s lack of an articulated local TIF policy. Though the city followed state 
legislative requirements regarding TIF, the lack of principled local guidelines 
enabled the city to become involved in a project that carried a high degree of risk. 
This risk was composed of a number of factors. For one, the TIF district was created 
to encompass a rural green field site. These sites can be highly speculative, as they 
sit neither in the path of imminent development nor within zones of demonstrated 
demand for goods and services.  
 
Another problem is that TIF bonds were used to finance an entertainment 
venue. These projects have drawn criticism from economic development scholars, 
such as Coates and Humphreys (2000), who have demonstrated that entertainment 
venues produce minimal economic development impacts compared to other types 
of publically financed developments. In another paper, I have attempted to show 
that this low economic return is particularly likely to occur when venues are located 
in non-urban areas (Levengood, 2009). Research also shows that to make 
entertainment venues more advantageous, local governments must craft policies 
that employ local workers and situate venues within broader planned commercial 
districts. Though Roanoke Rapids had planned such a district in Carolina 
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Crossroads, its development was never made requisite to the theater’s completion. 
This occurred despite claims by ERA Consultants that substantial development was 
necessary in order for the theater to be viable. 
 
A lack of a strong local policy also allowed the creation of an Economic 
Development Agreement that passed the project’s financial risk almost entirely to 
the city. Not only did the EDA require the city to pay Parton his exorbitant “artist 
fee,” it also required the city to purchase and own the theater. Parton and Moonlight 
Bandit were merely renters who therefore bore no responsible for the theater’s debt 
obligations. The EDA meanwhile pledged three revenue sources for the theater’s 
debt service, all of which involved the city’s money. While these sources were 
sufficient to gain LGC approval, they exposed the city to considerable financial and 
political burden. The pledging of the city’s sales tax was particularly ill advised, as it 
obligated the city to channel an important general funding source into a specific 
project. A final problem is that the city did not achieve a partnership with Halifax 
County. A city-county agreement would have distributed risk to another local 
government and secured an additional funding source for repaying bond debts. 
 
Legacy of a Failed TIF 
 
In the years following Parton’s departure, the Roanoke Rapids Theater has 
been operated by a handful of other companies yet continued to struggle. The 
Carolina Crossroads district likewise remains underdeveloped, with only a hotel and 
RV park having been built on the sprawling site (Google Maps, 2011). This outcome 
has strained the city’s financial resources and the city has at times cut services and 
proposed tax increases. In 2008, for example, in order to offset the theater’s cost, 
city government placed a hiring freeze on most employment positions and delayed 
purchases and initiatives (Minnick, 2008). And just recently in February 2011, the 
city considered a 1-cent increase in sales tax in order make payments on TIF debt 
(King, 2011).  
 
The aftermath of Roanoke Rapids has influenced the use of TIF in North 
Carolina. Although TIF remains relatively new to the state and has been inhibited 
recently by a poor economy, the tool’s limited track record suggests that some local 
governments have paid close attention to what has happened in Roanoke Rapids. In 
a survey of local governments’ positions on TIF, for example, Purvis (2008) found 
that local elected officials have been “hesitant to use TIF due to negative publicity” 
and that at least one local government “wanted to see TIF work” before considering 
it. Furthermore, Blocher and Morgan (2008) cite the Roanoke Rapids experience as 
having certainly “not helped the cause of promoting TIF use” in North Carolina. 
 
Beyond stymying TIF use, however, the Roanoke Rapids case was also an 
impetus for dialogue on institutional reform. It raised questions, for example, about 
the scope of the LGC approval process and has made local governments and citizens 
more aware of the risks of flawed TIF policy. The case also provides a foil to another 
TIF project in the state. Less than a year after Roanoke Rapids constructed the 
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Randy Parton Theater, a small town in the western North Carolina mountains 
implemented a TIF plan of its own. 
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Chapter 4: Using Local Policy to Guide TIF: the Case of Woodin 
 
Besides Roanoke Rapids, TIF has been utilized to finance development in 
only one other North Carolina location. In August 2008 Buncombe County issued 
nearly $13 million in TIF bonds to finance public improvements in Woodfin, a small 
municipality located just north of Asheville. Home to approximately 5,800 residents, 
the Town of Woodfin bills itself as a small-town community offering big city 
amenities (“Welcome to the Town of Woodfin, North Carolina,” 2011).  While these 
amenities have traditionally been provided over the city line in Asheville, in recent 
years Woodfin has managed to attract upscale businesses and new residents, due in 
large part to its use of TIF to promote development in a new “downtown corridor.”  
 
A More Accountable Planning Process 
 
The plan for the Woodfin Downtown Corridor Financing District grew out of 
the Town of Woodfin’s desire to replace a municipal golf course. Built on a former 
landfill site, the town’s 9-hole “executive short course” had been unprofitable. To 
remedy the fiscal strain, the Town closed the course in 2003 and put the land up for 
sale (J. Young, personal communication, 24 March 2011). 
 
After pursuing a number of developers, the town found a suitable buyer in 
Reynolda Mountain Partners, LLC, a high-end residential builder that owned other 
properties in Woodfin. The town, meanwhile, had initiated talks with Cherokee 
Investment Partners, a Raleigh-based equity firm that specializes in the 
redevelopment of economically and environmentally distressed sites. Together the 
town, Cherokee, and Reynolds Mountain formed a plan to redevelop the golf course 
and surrounding land into a new downtown corridor for Woodfin. During initial 
meetings in 2005, TIF was suggested as a potential financing strategy (J. Young, 
personal communication, 24 March 2011). 
 
From the beginning, the plans and policies surrounding the Woodfin TIF 
district contrasted sharply with those of Roanoke Rapids. Whereas Roanoke Rapids 
had teamed up with partners whose management capabilities were unproven and 
who were mired in conflicts of interest, Woodfin deliberately chose developers 
possessing proven track records. For example, one key Woodfin partner, CEO of 
Reynold’s Mountain Kirk Boone, was an Asheville-area native deeply invested in the 
community. Boone had already initiated development of a residential neighborhood 
bordering the TIF district and had developed numerous award-winning projects in 
the region (“About KCB Construction & Founder, Kirk Boone”). Cherokee Investment 
Partners likewise possessed a portfolio of award-winning developments (“Awards 
and Recognition”). Wary of the unfolding fiscal disaster at Roanoke Rapids, Woodfin 
Town Manager Jason Young cited these track records as having imbued the city with 
confidence (J. Young, personal communication, 24 March 2011).  
 
The presence of reliable developers and other partners was key to obtaining 
support from Buncombe County, which signed on to the project only after drafting 
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its own TIF policy (W. Greene, personal interview, 17 March 2011). Whereas Halifax 
County government did not participate in the Roanoke Rapids case, Buncombe 
County played an active role both in negotiating terms for Woodfin’s bonds and 
obtaining state approval. Before signing on, however, county officials considered a 
number of criteria in addition to the quality of project partners.  
 
As stated in the county’s “Project Development Financing Policy,” Buncombe 
only considers TIF “for projects that demonstrate a substantial and public benefit to 
a blighted area with the County”. Furthermore the county wanted to restrict TIF use 
to areas of the county that “we were truly not going to see grow, develop, or 
improve without some assistance” (W. Greene, personal interview, 17 March 2011). 
Including both a landfill and areas that had experienced “some economic 
depression,” the Woodfin TIF district satisfied these requirements. 
 
Buncombe County’s blight requirement contrasts with the TIF policies (or 
lack thereof) of both Roanoke Rapids and the state of North Carolina. Though 
located in a Tier One county within an economically depressed region, Roanoke 
Rapids has no blight requirement for TIF and chose to locate its theater on a non-
blighted rural green field. Though the state devotes language to blighted areas and 
redevelopment sites in its TIF enabling legislation, it nevertheless makes eligible a 
catch-all “economic development” category of developments.  
 
Targeting blight, in addition to being the original purpose of TIF, has also 
been shown to be its most advantageous use from the standpoint of economic 
development. Researchers have demonstrated, for instance, that property value 
growth is positively correlated with blight (Byrne, 2006). In other words, TIF 
projects located in these areas are more likely to be financially viable and therefore 
carry lower risk. Furthermore, these kinds of projects may put to work local 
unemployed and underemployed workers and provide certain goods and services to 
areas that lack them. 
 
Regardless of the low risk of redevelopment TIF districts, Buncombe County 
was still careful to make sure that it “did not get into any cash flow issues around 
[the project]” (W. Greene, personal interview, 17 March 2011). Unlike Roanoke 
Rapids, Buncombe negotiated (and now requires by policy) an arrangement that 
essentially absolved the county of any financial risk: the county insisted that 
Woodfin and the developer Reynolds Mountain sign a “Minimum Assessment 
Agreement.” The agreement required that all developer-owned property (which 
included all but 47 acres of the 205-acre TIF district) be assessed at a value 
sufficient to generate, along with taxes on other private district property, the tax 
proceeds needed to service the county’s bond debt (“Woodfin TIF-Summary”). In 
other words, the developer took on the responsibility for paying the interest the 
county owes lenders annually on the $13 million in bonds. Furthermore, the 
agreement represented a “covenant running with the land,” meaning all subsequent 
landowners would also be subject to the minimum assessment as long as the TIF 
district was in existence (“Minimum Assessment Agreement,” 2008). 
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On the same day the Minimum Assessment Agreement was signed, 
Buncombe County also entered into a formal contract with the Town of Woodfin. 
This “Interlocal Agreement” identified the town as being responsible for the 
district’s creation (which had occurred in November 2006), as well as the 
acquisition, construction, and equipping of the district’s public improvements. The 
county, meanwhile, was responsible for issuing the TIF bonds and managing bond 
revenues (“Interlocal Agreement,” 2008). With both the Minimum Assessment and 
Interlocal Agreements signed, Buncombe County finally issued $12,960,000 in TIF 
bonds in August 2008.  
 
Winning Approval from a Strengthened LGC 
 
Prior to issuing the bonds, however, Buncombe County, along with Woodfin, 
had endured a lengthy state approval process. Having won the approval of the 
Woodfin Board of Alderman and Buncombe County Board of Commissioners in 
November 2006, the plan for the TIF district was forwarded to the LGC in 2007. At 
that time, the LGC staff began a process of advisement with the town, county, and 
developers.  
 
Led by Tim Romocki, Director of the Debt Management Section of the N.C. 
Department of State Treasurer, the LGC staff educated the local partners on how to 
best structure their debt and limit risk to the jurisdiction and its taxpayers. 
According to Woodfin Town Manager Jason Young, “[Romocki] asked a lot of 
questions that on the one hand made the process seem more difficult, but [on the 
other] were very useful both to the county and town in terms of protecting our 
assets, especially given the volatility of the national real estate market” (J. Young, 
personal communication, 24 March 2011). This advisement, by which the LGC 
helped local governments clarify their policies and negotiate agreements, was cited 
as invaluable because according to Young, Woodfin lacked “the internal expertise to 
ask the right questions or identify the potential hazards [of TIF].” Furthermore, the 
town was dealing with “large companies that have their own counsels and are 
familiar with these kinds of instruments.” Therefore, the ability of the LGC staff to 
“swing a big stick” allowed the local governments to negotiate more favorable terms 
to the development agreements (J. Young, personal communication, 24 March 
2011). 
 
As required by North Carolina’s TIF enabling legislation, the ultimate 
responsibility of the LGC was to determine whether the town and county were 
capable of repaying TIF bonds. To make this finding, LGC staff structured their 
advisement differently than they had for Roanoke Rapids. For Woodfin, the LGC 
required the town to obtain a letter of credit or an equivalent from the developer (T. 
Romocki, personal communication, 24 March 2011). In lieu of this, the county 
substituted the Minimum Assessment Agreement, which was likewise a guarantee 
that the developer would bear the debt burden. Additionally, while LGC staff only 
“strongly recommended” that the city and county work together in Roanoke Rapids 
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case, for Woodfin city-county cooperation was required (T. Romocki, personal 
communication, 24 March 2011). 
 
Following the advisement by LGC staff, the 9-member Local Government 
Commission then considered the Woodfin case. Having granted tentative approval 
for the TIF “financing team” in March 2006, the Commission set a final hearing for 
August 2008. At that meeting, town and county officials made their last presentation 
and answered questions from Commission members. Satisfied that the plan was 
feasible, the LGC then granted final approval and authorized Buncombe County to 
issue TIF bonds.   
 
A Work in Progress 
 
Since the TIF’s approval in 2008, development in the Woodfin Downtown 
Corridor has proceeded slowly, yet steadily. Originally hampered by the nationwide 
dip in the real estate market, the corridor as of March 2011 counted six buildings 
under construction. These buildings will eventually house 65,000 square feet of 
commercial space and 201 high-end apartments (J. Young, personal communication, 
24 March 2011).  
 
In addition to these new developments, the district has already attracted a 
handful of businesses, including a manufacturer of satellite components that 
employs 150 workers, and a YMCA that has provided health and wellness services 
never before available in the community. The town and developers have also begun 
work on a greenway in the district. Furthermore, development in the corridor has 
promoted attendant growth outside the district that “was not likely to have 
occurred organically” (J. Young, personal communication, 24 March 2011). A hotdog 
restaurant, for example, has been replaced by a high-end eatery, and German and 
Thai restaurants are new additions to the town.  
 
As the district continues to develop, Woodfin and Buncombe County plan to 
issue additional TIF bonds. The original plan approved by the LGC in fact calls for 
three installments of TIF bonds to eventually total $25 million. While so far bond 
revenues have been spent primarily on new streets and sidewalks, water and sewer 
extensions, and landscaping within “Reynolds Village,” the town hopes to expand. 
The final component of the project will include soccer and baseball fields and other 
public amenities (J. Young, personal communication, 24 March 2011). 
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Chapter 5: Lessons and Policy Implications 
 
The diverse experiences of Roanoke Rapids and Woodfin/Buncombe County 
impart a number of lessons regarding TIF policy in North Carolina and by extension 
other states around the country. 
 
State-Level Regulation of TIF Has a Limit  
 
Despite North Carolina’s relatively strict TIF enabling legislation and LGC 
oversight, Roanoke Rapids was able to finance a high-risk, economically unviable 
project. Although the failure of the Randy Parton Theater was largely the result of 
poor local planning and policy decisions, the state nevertheless allowed Roanoke 
Rapids to pursue the theater and even approved the financing. The reasons this 
occurred have to do with state legislation not being sufficiently restrictive as well as 
the “pseudo-ministerial” interpretation of the LGC’s duty. 
 
North Carolina’s enabling legislation effectively precludes TIF from being 
used to finance oft-criticized types of development. Along with limits on the 
percentage of retail and residential allowed in non-blighted districts, the “but for” 
requirement has prevented the kinds of TIF-financed urban sprawl that have drawn 
criticism in other states. It is difficult, for example, to demonstrate that a suburban 
shopping mall or subdivision would likely not occur without public financing. 
Furthermore, the legislation’s cap on the percentage of land in a locality that can be 
covered by TIF districts limits strain on overlapping jurisdictions, such as school 
districts, and blocks TIF-funded mega-projects like New Mexico’s Mesa del Sol.  
 
Despite these safeguards, the state allows projects that promote “economic 
development” in non-blighted areas. It is under this premise that Roanoke Rapids 
sought and received approval for its theater. Also, by making special exceptions for 
“tourism-related developments” in Tier One counties, North Carolina’s legislation 
essentially promotes the kind of venues that produce especially dubious economic 
impacts.  
 
After exploiting these loopholes, Roanoke Rapids met a second safeguard—
the LGC—that should have rejected its proposal. Nevertheless, because of the 
“pseudo-ministerial” function of the LGC, TIF-financing for the theater was 
approved. A so-called “ministerial act” is a government approval involving no 
exercise of discretion (Cassidy, 2011). As an example, a government may be 
required to approve a subdivision plat if a landowner meets certain criteria. Though 
the LGC certainly exercises a great deal of discretion in deciding whether or not to 
approve a TIF proposal, its approach to the finding financial feasibility has been 
arguably ministerial. Therefore, because Roanoke Rapids was able to show that it 
could repay its debt (even if it was through unsavory means such as the city’s sales 
tax), the LGC was more or less compelled to approve the proposal.    
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In the aftermath of Roanoke Rapids, TIF critics and other observers have 
called on the LGC to reform its approval process. The John Locke Foundation, for 
example, has urged that the LGC consider more factors in its approval decisions, 
such the content of feasibility studies and the strength of project partners. Daren 
Bakst, the John Locke Foundation’s Legal and Regulatory Policy Analyst has gone 
further, calling for the LGC to “root out any improper private benefits or conflicts of 
interest linked to the TIF financing” and require the LGC to reject TIF proposals if 
property tax increment revenues are predicted to be insufficient (Bakst, 2008). Even 
former LGC members have echoed this need for reform. Former State Auditor Les 
Merritt, for example, believes the LGC should consider factors beyond simply 
financial feasibility (L. Merritt, personal communication, 16 March 2011).    
 
Beyond changes to LGC oversight, critics have also called for other reforms. 
The John Locke Foundation has argued for public votes on individual TIF proposals 
and increased transparency (“Agenda 2008: TIF Reform,” 2008). However, these 
kinds of restrictions may consequently deter TIF use even further in North Carolina. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many local governments are already hesitant to 
pursue TIF because of strict requirements and potentially costly steps for approval. 
Therefore, any official change in policy would require the state to weigh the costs 
and benefits of added regulation.  
 
Sound and Complementary Local Policy is Key to TIF Success 
 
As a compliment to state regulation, local governments must develop and 
execute sound TIF policy. Counties and municipalities bear the responsibility for 
most steps of the TIF planning and approval process. They must, for example, define 
a TIF district’s boundaries, create a financing plan, and determine the district’s base 
valuation (Purvis, 2008). Local governments also assume responsibility for repaying 
bonds; oversee the construction of TIF-funded public improvements; and work 
closely with developers and other stakeholders.  
 
Because local governments are most directly involved and ultimately most 
responsible for a TIF project’s success or failure, it follows that these institutions 
should be the most worthwhile targets for reform efforts and assistance. One major 
recommendation is that counties and municipalities create their own TIF policies. 
Buncombe County’s TIF policy was key to the success of the Woodfin TIF. Not only 
did the policy secure the risk-diverting Minimum Assessment Agreement, but it also 
required that TIF use be confined to blighted areas, a noble policy objective that is 
frequently skirted in state legislation.  
 
A stated local policy would also decrease uncertainty among developers, 
investors, taxpayers, and local government officials. This may in turn lead to 
increased developer interest in TIF and a more streamlined and less costly negation 
process. Another benefit to local policy is flexibility. According to Buncombe County 
Manager Wanda Greene, since Woodfin a number of TIF projects have been brought 
to the county’s Board of Commissioners. The county has turned down these 
 23 
proposals, however, because each was for a small land area or involved a small 
public investment. The county has been interested only in larger scale projects, for 
which “project development financing makes the most sense” (W. Greene, personal 
communication, 17 March 2011). This preference would be more easily 
communicated by the county’s local policy than in broader statewide legislation.  
   
As Woodfin demonstrates, sound local policies, whether written out or not, 
should contain certain key provisions. Most important is the need for governments 
to pass the financial burden on to developers rather than taxpayers. A Minimum 
Assessment Agreement is a particularly advantageous policy as it can completely 
absolve a municipality and its taxpayers from financial risk. If such an agreement is 
not unattainable, another recommendation is that local governments agree to 
pledge only the TIF district’s tax increment revenues. The pledging of jurisdiction-
wide funding sources such as sales taxes can threaten a city’s general fund and thus 
jeopardize public goods and services.  
 
Another recommendation is for local governments to only consider TIF for 
blighted areas in need of redevelopment. As discussed earlier, such areas are most 
likely to benefit from TIF and experience the largest increases in property values. 
Finally, inter-local cooperation is key to a TIF district’s success. As demonstrated in 
the Woodfin case, these agreements are beneficial because they strengthen the 
bargaining power of local government against developers; provide further checks 
on the decision-making process; facilitate the bond issuing process; and enable 
more property tax revenues to be collected to repay debts. 
 
Whereas the Woodfin case illustrates an example of how to pursue sound 
local policy, Roanoke Rapids demonstrates that a lack of such policy can devastate a 
TIF project and a city’s finances. In the absence of disciplined local policy, 
municipalities are free to finance high-risk TIF projects, such as entertainment 
venues, on non-blighted green fields. Furthermore, without due diligence on the 
part of local governments, conflicts of interests may fester and developers may 
become emboldened to negotiate inequitable contract terms. Randy Parton’s artist’s 
fee and theater rental agreement are but two examples of bad TIF terms. 
 
State and Local Collaboration and Outreach Can Improve Outcomes  
 
In the Woodfin case, town and county officials benefitted substantially from 
collaboration with the LGC. Not only did the LGC serve as a counterbalance to the 
power of developers, it also offered TIF guidance and expertise to a town that lacked 
such resources in house. With Roanoke Rapids, however, the LGC’s influence was 
somewhat diminished. Though LGC staff did advise the city, they made 
recommendations rather than required the city to follow certain policies. The LGC 
also practiced deference to the city and allowed local policymakers to make their 
own political and legislative decisions, even if they were ill advised.  
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With limits to state regulatory power and hesitance by some local 
governments to embrace TIF, a case can be made for an enhanced education 
function of the LGC. While LGC staff respond to proposals and inquiries about TIF, as 
well as provide a number of other financial services, they have not pursued active 
educational outreach since TIF legislation was first passed in 2004 (personal 
communication, Romocki). By educating local governments on TIF requirements 
and highlighting best (Woodfin) and worst (Roanoke Rapids) practices, the LGC 
could help to promote TIF adoption while preventing negative outcomes.  
 
The LGC could similarly educate the local citizens on TIF. Educating the 
public could serve two purposes. It could quell public backlash against TIF, which 
has been an impediment to TIF adoption in the aftermath of Roanoke Rapids. Once 
educated, informed voters could then also provide a check on a municipality’s TIF 
policies and plans. Had the citizens of Roanoke Rapids, for example, known more 
about TIF and their city’s plans to use it, they may have intervened earlier and 
pressured city officials to pursue better policy. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
The current economic downturn has inevitably quelled the policy debate on 
TIF in North Carolina and across the country. With real estate development grinding 
to a halt and local governments more fiscally strapped than ever, TIF has faded from 
the radar of policymakers, activists, scholars, and the general public. Yet, the Great 
Recession has meant that local governments, now more than ever, are in need of 
innovative financing mechanisms. TIF can still be one of these tools, and Woodfin is 
but one example of a municipality using TIF to finance economic development 
during recession. Furthermore, the institutional learning and policy changes that 
were applied in Woodfin following the Roanoke Rapids failure are evidence that TIF 
can experience ongoing reform without sacrificing its attractiveness as a financing 
tool.  
 
In a today’s resource-scarce economic development climate, TIF is capable of 
creating jobs, transforming neighborhoods, and making communities more 
attractive places for investment. However, these outcomes are not guaranteed. 
Indeed the North Carolina cases instruct that to achieve successful TIF districts, 
counties and municipalities must adopt sound and complementary local policies and 
collaborate with state-level institutions, which in turn must play a larger role in 
educating local jurisdictions. 
 
--- 
 
A few miles south of the Virginia state line, the Randy Parton Theater sits just 
beside Interstate 95. Incongruous to the surrounding pine forests, the white 
antebellum-styled structure draws ones eyes from the road. Its garish appearance, 
however, is but the cover to a cautionary tale of misguided local economic 
development in the 21st century. It is also testament to the resilience of TIF as a 
development financing mechanism. Less that a year after the Roanoke Rapids made 
headlines for its TIF-financed folly, across the state, another town gave TIF another 
try and enjoyed a far more positive experience. Despite near-polar differences 
between the two projects, Roanoke Rapids and Woodfin nevertheless teach similar 
lessons and underscore that as tax increment financing continues to evolve, good 
local policy is the bedrock for TIF 2.0. 
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